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1
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1. President of the United States of America, Second Inaugural Address
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit is the highest court to which veterans can
appeal by right for benefits. In 2009, the Federal Circuit decided
eighty-seven veterans cases (twelve percent of its overall docket).
Twenty-six of those decisions were precedential opinions. There are
approximately 23.4 million veterans in the United States, more than
2
three million of whom receive disability compensation. And with
two ongoing wars, plans to increase the size of the Army and Marine
Corps, and recent legislation impacting the veterans claims process,

2. NAT’L CTR. FOR VETERANS ANALYSIS & STATISTICS, VA BENEFITS & HEALTH CARE
UTILIZATION, Aug. 3, 2009, available at http://www1.va.gov/vetdata/docs/4X6_
summer09_sharepoint.pdf.
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the Federal Circuit will likely see an increase in veterans cases in the
3
coming years.
Part I of this article summarizes the eligibility criteria for veterans
benefits and the process by which a veteran’s claim reaches the
Federal Circuit. Part II explains the jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit with respect to veterans cases. Part III analyzes one Supreme
Court and nine Federal Circuit cases from 2009 that are important to
veterans benefits practitioners. These cases address, inter alia, issues
that arise from the Department of Veterans Affairs’s duty to assist
veterans with their claims, whether veterans have a Fifth Amendment
due process right to a claim for benefits, equitable tolling of the
deadlines for appealing benefits decisions, and the retroactive
assignment of disability ratings.
I.

ELIGIBILITY AND THE CLAIMS PROCESS

By the time a veteran’s case reaches the Federal Circuit, it has
traveled a long road that usually involves multiple medical
4
examinations, at least one administrative hearing and administrative
5
appeal, and review by a federal appellate court. But before we
summarize that process, it is important to understand who is eligible
to begin it.
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) defines a veteran as
“a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and
who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other
6
than dishonorable.” The “active” portion of the definition is satisfied
by anyone in the active duty military. National Guard members and
7
Reservists, however, are not automatically deemed veterans. They
must either be activated for “federal” service (as opposed to service to

3. See, e.g., What’s Ahead for Soldiers in 2010, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/01/army_fivethings3_010310w/ (discussing
the troop surge in Afghanistan, “where more casualties are expected as the troop
presence grows”); John Feffer, Obama: The Goldilocks President, THE HUFFINGTON
POST, Jan. 23, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/obama-thegoldilocks-pres_b_428971.html (discussing recent increases in the size of the Army
and Marine Corps and military spending).
4. Although there are several different types of claims that veterans may file
(e.g., survivor benefits, education benefits, etc.), this article focuses only on medical
disability claims because they constitute the vast majority of claims for benefits and
are thus most pertinent to the Federal Circuit.
5. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is the only court that
may review decisions of the Board of Veterans Appeals. See infra notes 29–34 and
accompanying text.
6. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006) (emphasis added); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2009)
(emphasis added).
7. 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(b).
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8

their state government) or be injured or killed during non-federal
9
service. Accordingly, a member of a Reserve unit that deploys to
Afghanistan would meet the requirement, whereas a member of a
Reserve unit that mobilizes pursuant to a state order to assist with a
natural disaster generally would not.
The other element in the definition of “veteran”—a discharge
under conditions other than dishonorable—is not as straightforward
as it may seem because, contrary to Hollywood depictions, there are
more than just “honorable” and “dishonorable” discharges. Rather,
the types of discharge include:
(1) honorable discharge;
(2) discharge under honorable conditions; (3) discharge under other
than honorable conditions; (4) bad conduct discharge; and
10
(5) dishonorable discharge.
As the names suggest, the first two
types of discharge are good; they result in “veteran” status for benefits
purposes. The last three types of discharge, however, are bad.
In fact, a dishonorable discharge is a bar to attaining the status of
11
veteran for benefits purposes.
The other two “bad” discharges,
however, do not automatically bar a person from obtaining the status
of veteran. If a person receives either a discharge under other than
honorable conditions or a bad conduct discharge and applies for
veterans benefits, the VA adjudicates the facts surrounding the
discharge and reviews the applicant’s entire service history to
12
determine eligibility to receive veterans benefits.
Once an applicant attains “veteran” status, the applicant can obtain
disability benefits from the VA by demonstrating: “(1) the existence
of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a
disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present
disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during
13
service.”

8. Id. § 3.7(o)(1) (stating that a person “ordered into service” may be eligible
for benefits).
9. 38 U.S.C. § 101(24); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(a).
10. See BARTON F. STICHMAN ET AL., VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL § 20.2 (2007).
11. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d).
12. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12.
13. Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Shedden v.
Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (applying
to wartime and peacetime service, respectively, and stating that there is a
presumption of sound condition when enrolled for service). There is no statute of
limitations for filing claims. Accordingly, some veterans file claims many years after
leaving active service, sometimes because they do not begin to experience symptoms
until later in life. Obviously, the more time that has passed between active service
and filing, the harder it is to prove that a current disability is connected to active
service.
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The veteran must prove those elements under the “benefit of the
14
doubt” standard. Under that standard, if the evidence regarding a
claim is in an “approximate balance of positive and negative . . . the
15
[VA] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.”
The claims process is not meant to be adversarial. To the contrary,
the statute imposes a long list of obligations on the VA to assist
veterans in presenting their claims by, for example, notifying veterans
of evidence necessary to complete their claim and making reasonable
16
efforts to obtain records in the government’s possession.
The injury or illness, however, cannot be the result of the veteran’s
17
own willful misconduct or abuse of alcohol or drugs. For example,
if an active duty service member robs a bank and during the robbery
is shot by the police and paralyzed, the injury would be deemed to be
due to the individual’s own misconduct. Accordingly, regardless of
the military discharge received, the service member would not be
entitled to disability compensation or treatment from the VA for the
paralysis.
A claim for disability benefits goes to one of fifty-eight VA Regional
Offices, which examines the claim to determine whether the claimant
meets the definition of a veteran and whether he or she has a
18
compensable injury or illness related to military service. The VA
must presume that the illness is not due to the veteran’s own
19
misconduct or drug or alcohol abuse. If there is evidence to suggest
that the illness is due to misconduct, the VA may rebut the
20
presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. If the claimant is

14. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).
15. Id.; see 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (mandating that if a “reasonable doubt arises . . .
such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant”).
16. See, e.g., Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475,
§ 5103A, 114 Stat. 2096, 2097 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 5102–5103A,
5107). The VA’s duty to assist veterans in filing claims pre-dates the VCAA, but the
VCAA was enacted in order to redefine and clarify the VA’s duties.
17. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(b).
18. See generally DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS
DEPENDENTS & SURVIVORS (2009), available at http://www1.va.gov/opa/vadocs/
fedben.pdf (describing the process and requirements for submitting a claim).
19. 38 U.S.C. § 105(a); see, e.g., Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 241, 244 (Ct. Vet.
App. 1992) (“[B]ecause [the veteran] was in the active naval service, his injuries are
deemed to have been in line of duty . . . .”); Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting the presumption that a disease or injury first manifested or
aggravated during active duty is service-connected).
20. E.g., Smith, 2 Vet. App. at 244 (citing Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54
(Ct. Vet. App. 1990) (requiring the Government to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the injuries in question were not sustained in the line of duty); Thomas
v. Nicholson, 423 F.3d 1279, 1284–85 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Thus, we find that
preponderance of the evidence is the proper evidentiary standard necessary to rebut
a § 105(a) presumption . . . .”).
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deemed a “veteran” under the statute and regulations and has a
compensable disability, the Regional Office determines the severity of
the disability (expressed as a percentage designed to account for the
“average impairments of earning capacity resulting from such injuries
21
in civil occupations”) and assigns a date in the past that the disability
22
The severity of the disability (i.e., the “rating”
took effect.
percentage) and the effective dates are fertile sources of litigation.
Another fertile source of litigation stems from the VA reducing
ratings after the initial rating or denying a veteran’s claim for an
increased rating. Because most injuries and illnesses are not static,
the VA may conduct follow-up examinations or the veteran may
submit a claim for an increased rating. For example, a veteran may
qualify for a 70% disability during a certain time interval when his
disability is especially potent, but that disability may subsequently
improve and be commensurate with only a 40% rating, or vice-versa.
The Federal Circuit has noted that, “[o]ver a period of many years, a
veteran’s disability claim may require reratings in accordance with
23
changes in . . . his or her physical or mental condition.”
The veteran can appeal any portion of the VA’s disability findings
24
(for both initial claims and subsequent ratings) by filing with the VA
25
a notice of disagreement. The veteran is entitled to retain counsel
and to an informal hearing in front of a Decision Reviewing Officer
26
(DRO) at the VA Regional Office. If the veteran disagrees with the
DRO’s findings, the veteran is entitled to a “formal” appeal to the
27
Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA), where the veteran may request a

21. 38 U.S.C. § 1155; see also 38 C.F.R. pt. 4 (discussing the general policies
regarding disabilities ratings).
22. E.g., Moore v. Shinseki, 555 F.3d 1369, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing
the history of a claim that included several adjustments to the effective date).
23. Id. at 1373 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.1).
24. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (stating that all decisions made by the Secretary are
subject to review); see also 38 C.F.R. § 19.1 (establishing the BVA). See generally
38 C.F.R. pt. 19 (outlining the regulations for the BVA).
25. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201.
26. Id. § 3.103. Current law prohibits a veteran from retaining paid counsel at
any step in the claims process before the notice of disagreement is filed.
See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c) (2006) (providing that, with limited exceptions, “a fee may
not be charged, allowed, or paid for services of agents and attorneys with respect to
services provided before the date on which a notice of disagreement is filed”). This
prohibition on representation has been frequently criticized as, among other things,
contributing to the inefficiency of the claims process, see Matthew J. Dowd, Note,
No Claim Adjudication Without Representation: A Criticism of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c), 16 FED.
CIR. B.J. 53, 71–78 (2006), and costing individual veterans thousands of dollars in
benefits, if not more, see Benjamin W. Wright, The Potential Repercussions of Denying
Disabled Veterans the Freedom to Hire an Attorney, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 433, 446–57 (2010).
27. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3)–(5); 38 C.F.R. § 20.202.
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28

hearing.
If the veteran disagrees with the BVA, he or she may
29
appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC).
The CAVC was established in 1988 pursuant to Article I of the
30
United States Constitution to provide an “impartial judicial forum
for review of administrative decisions . . . that are adverse to the
31
veteran-appellant’s claim.” It has “exclusive jurisdiction to review
32
decisions of the [BVA].” Despite this nation’s tradition of having
courts review administrative agency determinations, there was almost
no review of VA determinations before Congress established the
33
CAVC. Veterans may appeal final decisions of the CAVC to the
34
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTION OVER VETERANS CLAIMS
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction in the area of veterans law is
narrow but significant. The court has two jurisdictional bases for
exercising review. First, the court may hear appeals from decisions of
35
the CAVC, but it may only decide purely legal questions. Essentially,
the Federal Circuit acts as a secondary appellate court over the
CAVC. This makes it the only federal appellate court besides the
Supreme Court to review the decisions of another federal appellate
36
court. Second, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over
challenges to VA rules and regulations under the Administrative
37
Procedure Act.
As a result of this unique jurisdictional scheme, the Federal Circuit
“does not issue very many precedential opinions in the area of
veterans law,” but those that is does issue “are usually quite
38
important.”
28. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 13.2.
29. 38 U.S.C. § 7252.
30. Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
31. U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Welcome, http://
www.uscourts.cavc.gov (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
32. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
33. See STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 15.1.1 (“[D]uring most of the twentieth
century decisions of the [VA] . . . were exempt from court review.”). Nothing,
however, precluded a veteran from challenging the constitutionality of VA decisions.
See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (“Plainly, no explicit provision of
§ 211(a) bars judicial consideration of appellee’s constitutional claims.”).
34. 38 U.S.C. § 7292.
35. Id. § 7292(d).
36. See infra note 39.
37. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c).
38. Chief Judge Glenn Archer, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
The Third Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Veterans
Appeals (Oct. 17–18, 1994), in 8 Vet. App. CXCI (1996).
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A. Federal Circuit Review of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
Federal Circuit review of the CAVC is unusual because the latter is
39
itself an appellate court. Perhaps as a partial consequence, very few
40
veterans claims are successfully appealed to the Federal Circuit.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over CAVC appeals is
41
limited to review of issues of pure law. Indeed, the Federal Circuit is
specifically prohibited from entertaining “a challenge to a factual
determination” or “a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to
the facts of a particular case,” except insofar as such facts present a
42
constitutional issue.
To date, this unusual bar on the Federal
Circuit’s review of non-constitutional facts in veterans cases has
withstood challenges on the rationale that such cases are still given
three levels of factual review by administrative bodies and lower
43
courts, including the CAVC.
The prohibition on reviewing any non-constitutional facts
significantly limits the number of veterans appeals heard by the
44
Federal Circuit.
However, the Federal Circuit’s appellate
jurisdiction over legal issues includes authority to review the validity
and proper interpretation of statutes and regulations upon which the
CAVC relies in reaching a judgment, as well as the ability to review
45
other legal issues that are not derived from a statute or regulation.
In other words, the Federal Circuit exercises appellate review over all

39. See Letter from William P. Greene, Jr., Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims, to John J. Hall, Chairman, Subcomm. on Disability Assistance &
Memorial Affairs, Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives
(June 5, 2007), available at http://veterans.house.gov/Media/File/110/5-22-07/
courtofappealsfollow-up.htm (discussing the benefits of additional federal appellate
review of CAVC decisions); see also Michael P. Allen, The United States Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims at Twenty: A Proposal for a Legislative Commission to Consider Its Future,
58 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 380 (2009) (“[T]here is no other situation in the federal
court system in which the decisions of one appellate body are subject to review as of
right in another appellate body, other than the Supreme Court”).
40. Of the approximately “half of one percent of cases [that] are appealed to the
CAVC, . . . the number of veterans appeals that the Federal Circuit hears on the
merits is negligible compared to the overall volume of [veterans] claims.” James D.
Ridgway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later: Confronting the New
Complexities of VA Adjudication, 65 ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=james_ridgway
41. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (d)(1).
42. Id. § 7292(d)(2).
43. See, e.g., Bradley v. Nicholson, 181 Fed. App’x 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 887 (2006) (holding that the Federal Circuit’s limited
jurisdiction does not deprive veterans of equal protection).
44. See, e.g., Archer, supra note 38, at CLXXXVI–CXCI (noting that “about 80
percent of the [CAVC] cases appealed to our court so far have been jurisdictionally
defective”).
45. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a).
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questions of law raised in CAVC decisions, including judicially
46
created rules of law, but not over non-constitutional facts.
The Federal Circuit applies a de novo standard of review to legal
questions decided by the CAVC and has broad latitude to overturn
laws, statutes, regulations, or interpretations thereof, if they are
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unconstitutional,
contrary to statute, in excess of statutory authority, without
observance of procedure required by law, or otherwise not in
47
accordance with law.
The leading practitioners’ guide on veterans law identifies three
“potential roadblocks” to obtaining Federal Circuit review of legal
48
issues in CAVC decisions.
First, the issue on appeal must be
carefully framed as one solely of legal interpretation, rather than
49
application of law to facts. Second, the issue being appealed is more
50
likely to be heard if it was “relied upon” by CAVC in its decision.
Third, and finally, the issue being appealed generally should have
51
been raised in the lower courts.

46. Recent cases illustrate the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over issues of law, but
not fact. Compare Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1308 n.5
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (allowing review of a facial challenge to VA regulations),
with Kokenge v. Nicholson, 179 Fed. App’x 31, 32 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (dismissing a
service connection claim because it challenged the application of laws and
regulations and not the law or statutes themselves), and Kince v. Nicholson, 161 Fed.
App’x 938, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction an appeal
claiming alleged misinterpretation of medical records).
47. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7292(d)(1).
48. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 15.8.1.6–7.
49. Id. at 1269–71 (citing Cook v. Principi, 353 F.3d 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2003));
see also Ferguson v. Principi, 273 F.3d 1072, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction does not extend to review of challenges to the
application of a law or specific factual determinations); Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d
1477, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Congress has provided that our authority to review the
decisions of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Appeals is restricted to entertaining
appeals that seek review of the validity of any statute or regulation, or any
interpretations thereof, or that raise constitutional controversies.”).
50. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1271–72. But see Morgan v. Principi,
327 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that “in a case such as this, in which
the decision below regarding a governing rule of law would have been altered by
adopting the position being urged, this court has jurisdiction to entertain the matter,
even though the issue underlying the stated position was not ‘relied on’ by the
Veterans Court”).
51. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1272–73. This is a prudential rather than
jurisdictional bar, with recognized judicial exceptions in the case of new intervening
statutes, novel interpretations of existing law, pro se litigants, and unraised legal
issues that are nonetheless necessary to consider a legal issue properly raised below.
Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1338, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that
“even when jurisdiction exists, prudential considerations should severely limit the
exercise of our authority to consider issues not raised or decided below”).
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B. Federal Circuit Review of the Department of Veterans Affairs
The Federal Circuit also has jurisdiction to review challenges to VA
“regulations, rules of procedure, substantive rules of general
applicability, statements of general policy and interpretations of
general applicability, including opinions and interpretations [by the
52
Department’s General Counsel]. ” This jurisdiction is governed by
the review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and acts as
a relatively expedient alternative to the much lengthier VA
53
administrative appeals process. There is, however, one significant
statutory exception to the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to review VA
regulations: the adoption or revision of the VA disability rating
schedule may only be reviewed by the Federal Circuit on
54
constitutional grounds.
C. Procedural Limits On Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Over Veterans Claims
Beyond the substantive limitations on the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdiction over appeals from the CAVC and direct review of VA
rules and regulations, certain procedural practices also affect Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over veterans claims. Veterans must appeal
judgments of the CAVC within sixty days to be heard by the Federal
55
Circuit. Additionally, as a general rule, only final decisions of the
56
CAVC can be appealed. In Williams v. Principi, however, the Federal
Circuit promulgated a three-part test to allow for very limited appeals
of non-final CAVC decisions where the proceeding has been
57
remanded to the Board of Veterans Appeals. First, there must be
“a clear and final decision of a legal issue that . . . is separate from the
58
remand proceedings.” The CAVC’s final decision on this legal issue
must be dispositive—either directly governing the remand
59
proceedings or rendering them unnecessary. Second, the CAVC’s
resolution of the legal issue “must adversely affect the party seeking
60
review.” Finally, “there must be a substantial risk that the decision
52. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1273.
53. See 38 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) (stating that direct challenges to actions of the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs may be brought in accordance with 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06).
54. See id.; see also Nyeholt v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 298 F.3d 1350, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]bsent an express provision that such review is prohibited, we
read the legislative history . . . as confirming our view that Congress did not intend to
preclude constitutional challenges from review under § 502.”).
55. See, e.g., Ayers v. Peake, 274 Fed. App’x 882, 882–83 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
56. 275 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
57. Id. at 1364.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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would not survive a remand, i.e., that the remand proceeding may
61
moot the issue.” All three prongs of the Williams test must be met
for the Federal Circuit to exercise jurisdiction over a case that has
62
been remanded by the CAVC.
The Federal Circuit has also adopted a standard to determine
when it has jurisdiction in a case with multiple claims remanded by
the CAVC, where some claims have been fully decided. Specifically,
63
the court held in Elkins v. Gober that if the various claims are not
intertwined and the exercise of jurisdiction would not “disrupt the
orderly process of adjudicat[ing]” the remanded claims, then the
64
fully decided claims may be appealed.
III. ONE SUPREME COURT AND NINE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES FROM
2009 THAT VETERANS BENEFITS PRACTITIONERS SHOULD KNOW
The Federal Circuit issued twenty-four precedential veterans law
opinions in 2009. Below is a summary and analysis of the cases that
are especially important to veterans benefits practitioners because
they address particularly important issues or issues that recur
frequently. Several cases address, under various fact patterns, the
VA’s obligation to assist veterans with their claims, including where a
veteran suffers from a psychiatric disorder. Although the VA’s
obligation to assist veterans with their claims is not new, the Veterans
Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) represents Congress’s attempt
65
to clarify the VA’s obligations.
Not surprisingly, the VCAA has
triggered much litigation. Other cases discussed below address, inter
alia, whether a veteran has a Fifth Amendment due process right to a
claim for benefits, equitable tolling of the deadline for appeal to the
CAVC, the statutory presumptions that accompany every veteran’s
claim and the role those presumptions play in establishing a claim,
and the retroactive assignment of disability ratings.

61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1270, 1272, 1275 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (determining that the court had jurisdiction over the appeal because the legal
issues on appeal meet each prong laid out in Williams); Myore v. Principi, 323 F.3d
1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that there was no final appealable order
because there was no substantial risk that the issue would not survive remand and,
therefore, dismissing the appeal).
63. 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
64. Id. at 1375–76 (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
65. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the obligations laid out
in the VCAA).
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We begin with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Shinseki v. Sanders,
67
which reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision in Sanders v. Nicholson.
A. Shinseki v. Sanders

The VA claims process is unique compared to most other federal
agency proceedings. Instead of opposing claims or remaining
neutral, the VA has a duty to assist veterans in developing benefits
68
claims. The VCAA is one codification of that duty and is mirrored
in VA regulations, which direct the VA to provide claimants with
notice of: (1) what further information is necessary to substantiate
the claim (“Type One” notice); (2) what portions of that information
the VA will obtain for the claimant (“Type Two” notice); and (3) what
69
portions the claimant must obtain (“Type Three” notice). At the
time of the Federal Circuit’s Sanders decision, the regulations also
required the VA to tell the claimant that he or she could submit any
other relevant information that the claimant had available (“Type
70
Four” notice).
Sanders concerned competing frameworks, one used by the CAVC
and another used by the Federal Circuit, for addressing errors in
providing these four types of notice. The Supreme Court found the
Federal Circuit’s framework for addressing VA notice deficiencies to
be “too complex and rigid,” with presumptions that “impose[d]
unreasonable evidentiary burdens,” and conflicted with “established
71
[statutory] law.”
Sanders involved two veterans with different medical conditions, but
who both alleged that they had received insufficient notice from the
VA. Petitioner Woodrow Sanders was a veteran of World War II who
claimed that a bazooka explosion in 1944 precipitated blindness in
72
his right eye years later.
Although his 1945 service discharge
examination showed near-perfect vision, Sanders filed a claim for
disability benefits after a 1948 eye examination revealed an
73
inflammation causing near blindness. The VA denied the claim in
74
1949 for lack of a service connection. At Sanders’s urging, the VA

66. 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009).
67. 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct.
1696 (2009).
68. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (2006).
69. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2009).
70. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1700–01 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1)).
71. Id. at 1700.
72. Id. at 1701.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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reopened his claim in 1992 and, following a medical examination,
75
Another medical examination and BVA review
denied it again.
76
followed, resulting in another denial. On appeal, the CAVC found
merit in Sanders’s arguments that the VA failed to provide proper
Type Two notice (evidence the VA will obtain) and Type Three
77
notice (evidence Sanders had to obtain). The CAVC held, however,
that the errors were harmless because Sanders had not identified
what different evidence he would have produced or asked the VA to
78
produce.
The second petitioner, Patricia Simmons, applied for disability
benefits for a claimed service-related hearing loss in her left ear
79
following her discharge from active duty in April 1980.
In November 1980, the VA denied her claim on the basis that the
80
injury was not sufficiently severe. The VA reopened the claim in
1998 after Simmons provided medical records showing further
hearing loss in her left ear, along with allegedly related hearing loss
81
in her right ear.
Following additional hearing examinations,
however, the VA once again concluded that Simmons’s hearing loss
in her left ear was not severe enough to qualify for benefits and that
the hearing loss in her right ear was unrelated to service and not
82
severe enough to qualify for benefits. The BVA affirmed; Simmons
83
appealed to the CAVC. On appeal, Simmons also alleged a lack of
notice by the VA regarding a scheduled medical examination as well
as a Type One notice error for failing to tell her what further
84
information was needed to substantiate her claim. The CAVC found
85
merit in both of her claims and held both errors to be prejudicial.
The Federal Circuit consolidated the cases and held that when the
VA’s notice to a claimant is deficient in any respect, the error is
86
presumed to be prejudicial. The Federal Circuit further held that it
is the VA’s burden to show that the error did not affect the essential
fairness of the adjudication, either by demonstrating actual
knowledge of the defect by the claimant or that the benefit could not

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1702.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1703.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1702–04.
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87

have been awarded as a matter of law. Under this framework, the
Federal Circuit ruled in favor of both petitioners, reversing the
CAVC’s decision against Sanders and affirming the judgment in favor
88
of Simmons.
The Supreme Court found the Federal Circuit’s “presumption of
prejudice” framework legally inconsistent with the statutory
requirement that the CAVC “take due account of the rule of
89
prejudicial error.” Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer concluded
that the statutory “prejudicial error” edict compelled application of
the “same kind of ‘harmless-error’ rule that courts ordinarily apply in
90
civil cases.” In the majority’s view, this interpretation was bolstered
by congruity between the statutory language governing the CAVC and
an identical provision in the Administrative Procedure Act, as well the
91
CAVC’s legislative history.
Adopting this familiar “harmless-error” rule, the Supreme Court
found the Federal Circuit’s framework to be flawed on three
92
grounds. First, the Court held that the Federal Circuit effectively
created a mandatory presumption that deviated from the typical case93
specific application of judgment. Second, the Court found that the
Federal Circuit imposed an unreasonably high evidentiary burden on
the VA to prove a lack of prejudice, noting that requiring the
government to demonstrate a claimant’s state of mind was “difficult,
94
perhaps impossible.” Finally, the Court faulted the Federal Circuit
for requiring the VA, rather than the claimant, to explain why the
95
error was harmless. Under the Court’s view, the party that seeks to
set aside a ruling typically bears the burden of demonstrating
96
prejudice. Consequently, the Court struck down the Federal
Circuit’s framework and reversed the Federal Circuit’s judgment
97
regarding Sanders, while remanding the Simmons proceeding.
Two implications of Sanders are particularly noteworthy for
practitioners of veterans law. First, VA failures to provide notice will
87. Id. at 1702–03.
88. Id. at 1703.
89. Id. at 1704 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (2006)).
90. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006) (“On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the
record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.”).
91. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1704.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1704–05.
94. Id. at 1705.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1708.
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not result in a presumption in favor of veterans. Rather, veterans will
bear the burden of demonstrating prejudicial error. Second, CAVC
biases in assessing prejudicial error will guide the success of claims.
Under CAVC precedent, Type One notice errors (further
information required to substantiate a claim) are more likely to be
prejudicial whereas Type Two (evidence the VA will obtain) and Type
98
Three (evidence the veteran must obtain) notice errors are not.
As a result, veterans will likely have a higher success rate at the CAVC
with Type One notice errors than with others.
99

B. Henderson v. Shinseki

In this divisive and highly significant case, the Federal Circuit
addressed the issue of equitable tolling where a claimant wishes to
100
appeal a final decision of the BVA to the CAVC. Under 38 U.S.C.
§ 7266(a), veterans have a 120-day deadline following the mailing of a
notice of decision from the BVA to appeal that decision to the
101
CAVC.
Longstanding Federal Circuit precedent had allowed the
CAVC to toll this 120-day deadline for equitable reasons, effectively
102
creating a good-cause exception to the statutory deadline. The sole
issue decided in Henderson was whether cases allowing equitable
tolling were still valid in light of the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision
in Bowles v. Russell, which held that the timely filing of a notice of
appeal in a civil case was a jurisdictional requirement not subject to
103
equitable tolling.
Henderson held that the 120-day statutory deadline for appeals to
the CAVC is a notice of appeal, or time of review, provision in a civil
case, which is jurisdictional and therefore cannot be tolled without
104
congressional authorization.
In reaching this conclusion, the
Federal Circuit explicitly overruled two prior decisions, Bailey v.
105
106
West and Jaquay v. Principi, which had collectively established the
107
authority of the CAVC to permit tolling in actions filed before it.
In explaining this reversal, the Henderson majority concluded that
98. See id. at 1703 (noting that “Type One notice error has the ‘natural effect of
producing prejudice’”).
99. 589 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
100. Id. at 1205.
101. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2006).
102. Henderson, 589 F.3d at 1203 (discussing cases that permitted equitable tolling
under 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a)).
103. Id.; Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206–07 (2007).
104. Id. at 1220.
105. 160 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
106. 304 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
107. Henderson, 589 F.3d at 1203.
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those cases “have been overtaken by subsequent authority,
specifically, Bowles, where the Supreme Court unequivocally stated
that ‘the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a
jurisdictional requirement’ and that it had ‘no authority to create
108
equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.’”
109
Daniel Henderson served on active duty from 1950 to 1952.
Following a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, he was discharged
110
and received a 100% disability rating.
Due to a need for in-home
care, Henderson filed a claim for monthly compensation with the VA
111
in August of 2001.
The Regional Office denied that claim, and
Henderson appealed to the BVA, which denied the claim on August
112
Henderson appealed the BVA’s denial to the CAVC on
30, 2004.
January 12, 2005—fifteen days after the 120-day statutory period had
113
run. Henderson explained to the CAVC that the “failure to timely
appeal was a direct result” of his medical condition and requested
114
equitable tolling under Bailey. In March of 2006, a single judge of
the CAVC held that equitable tolling was inappropriate and dismissed
115
Henderson’s appeal. The Supreme Court then decided Bowles, and
a divided three-judge panel of the CAVC relied on Bowles to once
116
again dismiss Henderson’s claim as untimely. The en banc Federal
Circuit affirmed the CAVC decision and overruled Bailey and
117
Jaquay.
The Federal Circuit commenced its analysis in Henderson by
reviewing Bailey and Jaquay. In Bailey, an en banc Federal Circuit
interpreted the § 7266(a) 120-day notice of appeal provision as a
“time of review provision,” which was typically construed as
118
However, the court relied on the
“mandatory and jurisdictional.”
119
Supreme Court’s decision in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
which dealt with an ostensibly analogous statute of limitations, to
hold that equitable tolling was not barred in the absence of

108. Id. at 1220 (citing Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214).
109. Id. at 1203.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1204.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1203.
118. Id. at 1206 (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)).
119. 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (holding that the same rebuttable presumption of
equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should apply to suits
against the United States).
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120

congressional expression to that effect. Jaquay cemented the effect
of Bailey by applying this equitable tolling exception to grant relief to
a veteran who incorrectly filed a motion for reconsideration of his
121
final BVA decision with the VA rather than the CAVC.
Against this backdrop of settled case law, the Henderson court
(a nine-judge majority of the Federal Circuit) held that the Supreme
122
Court’s opinion in Bowles mandated a revision of precedent.
In Bowles, a U.S. district court permitted a federal habeas petitioner
seventeen days to file a notice of appeal—three days more than
allowed by statue and under the Federal Rules of Appellate
123
Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the statutory limit on the
period for appeal was more than a “claim-processing rule”; it was
124
mandatory and jurisdictional.
Applying Bowles to the issue in
Henderson, the Federal Circuit majority concluded that Bowles had
abrogated the holding of Bailey, which permitted equitable tolling of
125
the deadline for appeal to the CAVC. Accordingly, the court held,
§ 7266(a) is a time of review provision and timely filing a notice of
126
appeal is a jurisdictional requirement.
The Henderson decision carries enormous implications for
practitioners of veterans law. While the decision only affects appeals
to the CAVC, it is significant nonetheless because, as Judge Mayer
noted in dissent, “[i]t is the veteran who incurs the most devastating
service-connected injury who will often be the least able to comply
127
with rigidly enforced filing deadlines.”
Given its harsh and
controversial result, Henderson (as well as Bowles) may be subject to
future judicial or legislative revision. Currently, however, the
Henderson decision repudiates more than a decade of judicial support
for equitable tolling in appeals to the CAVC, and imposes an
inflexible requirement of compliance with the 120-day deadline for
appeals under § 7266(a).
120. Henderson, 589 F.3d at 1206 (citing Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 1998, overruled by Henderson, 589 F.3d 1201).
121. Id. at 1203 (citing Jaquay v. Principi, 304 F.3d 1276, 1278 (2002)).
122. Id. at 1216.
123. Id. at 1209 (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 207 (2007)).
124. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213.
125. Henderson, 589 F.3d at 1220.
126. Id. In reaching its decision, the Henderson court rejected three arguments:
(1) that § 7266(a) was analogous to a statute of limitations provision rather than a
jurisdictional time review provision and therefore was governed by Irwin rather than
Bowles; (2) that Bowles should be limited to Article III courts and not be extended to
Article I courts, such as the CAVC; and (3) that the unique, pro-claimant nature of
the veterans system precluded the stringent application of a time of review provision.
Id. at 1210–20.
127. Id. at 1221 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
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128

Cushman presented the Federal Circuit with a constitutional
question of first impression:
whether a veteran has a Fifth
Amendment due process right to fair adjudication of a claim for
129
disability benefits.
The court held that a veteran has a
constitutionally protected property interest in a benefits claim and
that the VA violated Cushman’s due process rights when the agency
130
based a benefits decision on an improperly altered medical record.
131
Philip Cushman served in the Marine Corps in the Vietnam War.
While he was in Vietnam, a sandbag fell on his back, damaging his
132
spine. In 1974, Cushman applied for disability benefits due to his
133
back injury, and received a 60% disability rating. In 1976, after his
injury forced him to resign from his job at a flooring store, Cushman
134
visited a VA Outpatient Clinic for reassessment of his condition.
In the last entry of Cushman’s medical record, the VA doctor
describing Cushman’s back condition wrote: “Is worse + must stop
135
present type of work.”
Cushman filed a request for total disability
136
based upon individual unemployability (TDIU) in May 1977.
The
VA Regional Office denied the request in July 1977 and, in April
1980, the BVA affirmed, noting that “the evidence fail[ed] to show
the presence of symptomology which would preclude sedentary
137
employment.” In 1982, Cushman petitioned the BVA to reconsider
its 1980 decision. The BVA reconsidered the decision and, based on
138
the same evidentiary record, reaffirmed it.
In 1997, however, Cushman discovered that the medical record
upon which the Regional Office and the BVA relied in denying his
request for TDIU differed from the medical record on file at the VA
139
Outpatient Clinic.
Specifically, the doctor’s last entry had been
altered to read: “Is worse + must stop present type of work, or at least
140
[] bend [] stoop lift.” The altered record also contained an additional
128. 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
129. Id. at 1292.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1292–93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. at 1293.
137. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The VA eventually granted Cushman
a TDIU rating in 1994. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1293–94.
140. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added by the court, brackets
added by the court to indicate illegible or stray marks).
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entry stating that Cushman “says he is applying for reevaluation of
141
back condition.” When Cushman learned of the altered record, he
challenged the 1977 Regional Office decision and the BVA’s 1980
142
and 1982 decisions as containing clear and unmistakable error.
After protracted proceedings, the BVA and the CAVC rejected
143
Cushman’s claim of error, and he appealed to the Federal Circuit.
In a unanimous opinion by Judge Prost, the Federal Circuit vacated
144
the decision of the CAVC. After rejecting the government’s motion
for voluntary remand or, in the alternative, for mandatory
145
mediation,
the court turned to the constitutional issues:
(i) whether a veteran, like Cushman, has a property interest in an
unadjudicated application for benefits, and (ii) if so, whether the
presence of the altered record violated Cushman’s due process right
146
to a fundamentally fair hearing.
As for the first issue, the court
noted that, under established Supreme Court case law, an applicant
for government benefits has a protected property interest if the
applicant “ha[s] a legitimate claim of entitlement” to the benefits
147
sought. However, the applicant does not have a protected property
interest “if government officials may grant or deny [the application]
148
in their discretion.”
Noting that the statutes outlining the benefits
available to veterans “provide an absolute right of benefits to qualified
149
individuals,” the court concluded that a veteran who meets the
150
eligibility criteria has a property interest protected by the Fifth
151
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
141. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Id. at 1294; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5109A (2006) (outlining the standards for
clear-and-unmistakable-error review).
143. See Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1294–95.
14. Id. at 1292.
145. See id. at 1295–96. The court determined that a remand to the BVA for
reconsideration of its 1980 and 1982 decisions would “not guarantee Mr. Cushman
adequate relief” and that court-ordered mediation was not appropriate because the
government had initially opposed mediation as an alternative to appeal. Id.
146. See id. at 1296–1300.
147. Id. at 1297 (quoting Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748,
756 (2005)) (emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. (quoting Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 756) (emphasis added, internal quotation
marks omitted).
149. Id. (emphasis added); see 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006) (“For disability resulting
from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty . . . during a
period of war, the United States will pay to any veteran thus disabled and who was
discharged or released under conditions other than dishonorable . . . compensation
as provided in this subchapter . . . .”) (emphasis added).
150. As noted above, these criteria are (1) present disability; (2) in-service
occurrence or aggravation; and (3) causal nexus between the present disability and
the disability incurred or aggravated in service. See supra Part I.
151. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1297–98 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1298
(“Veteran’s disability benefits are nondiscretionary, statutorily mandated benefits.
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Because Cushman indisputably met the eligibility criteria for
veteran’s benefits, the court next considered whether the VA had
violated Cushman’s due process right to a fair adjudication of his
claim. Relying on both criminal and civil cases holding improper
alteration of medical evidence to be due process violations, the court
easily determined that the VA had violated Cushman’s Fifth
152
Amendment rights.
The court also determined that the VA’s
consideration of the altered document was sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant appellate relief because “[t]he altered document was the only
piece of medical evidence that addressed Mr. Cushman’s then
153
current employability.”
The court thus vacated the CAVC’s
decision and remanded with instructions that the BVA conduct a de
154
novo review of Cushman’s 1977 TDIU request.
For veterans benefits practitioners, the crucial holding of Cushman
is that a veteran has a constitutionally protected property interest in a
claim for disability benefits. Accordingly, even if the process used by
the government to adjudicate benefits claims generally provides a
constitutionally adequate process (i.e., the process is not subject to a
facial attack), that process must still be applied in a fundamentally
155
fair manner in each and every case.
Cushman makes clear that a
veteran whose claim for benefits was not adjudicated in a
fundamentally fair manner—if, for example, the proceeding was
prejudicially tainted by the admission of improper evidence or the
suppression of favorable evidence—has a constitutional right to seek
readjudication of the claim in a manner that satisfies due process.
D. Holton v. Shinseki

156

Veterans who apply for disability benefits receive certain statutory
presumptions that ease their burden of proving the essential
elements of a disability claim. (As noted, these essential elements
are: (1) a present disability, (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation
of a disease or injury, and (3) a causal relationship between the two.)
A veteran is entitled to disability benefits upon a showing that he meets the eligibility
requirements set forth in the governing statutes or regulations.”).
152. See id. at 1300 (citing Grillo v. Coughlin, 31 F.3d 53, 56–57 (2d Cir. 1994);
Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 872 (6th Cir. 1997)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 1299–1300 (“The procedural framework for adjudicating claims
must be sufficient for the large majority of a group of claims in order to be
constitutionally adequate for all. A fundamentally fair adjudication within that
framework, however, is constitutionally required in all cases, and not just in the large
majority.”) (internal citation omitted, emphasis added).
156. 557 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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One presumption is that the veteran’s in-service injury occurred in
157
the line of duty and was not due to the veteran’s own misconduct.
Another presumption is that the veteran was “of sound condition”
158
(i.e., had no disease or injury) when he or she entered the military.
At times, veterans have tried to stretch these legal presumptions to fill
evidentiary gaps in their claims. Because this is a common argument,
cases containing it normally do not garner special attention from the
Federal Circuit. In Holton, however, one veteran added a twist:
He claimed that the “line of duty” presumption required the VA to
instruct the physician conducting the medical nexus opinion to
presume that the veteran suffered the injury in service and to state an
opinion “only as to whether the current disability was related to that
159
presumed [in-service] injury.”
The court in Holton rejected that
argument, however, and confirmed that the “line of duty”
presumption does not require an examining physician to presume
the existence of an asserted in-service injury when providing a
160
medical nexus opinion.
Holton was a consolidation of two appeals, those of John Holton
and Denver Bryant, in which the CAVC affirmed the denial of their
161
claims for disability compensation.
The Federal Circuit affirmed
162
the CAVC.
Holton
Holton served in the United States Coast Guard from 1968 to
163
1972. In 2002, he filed a claim with the VA for disability relating to
164
a fractured pelvis.
The VA Regional Office denied the claim
because his military medical records showed no evidence of any
165
Holton brought the claim because, years after his
pelvic injury.
service ended, he began experiencing pain in his right hip and
166
167
buttocks. A 2002 x-ray showed a pelvic fracture. Holton surmised
that the fracture was the result of him slipping and falling on ship
168
during his service thirty years earlier.
On appeal to the BVA, the
1.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

38 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
Holton, 557 F.3d at 1366–67.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1364.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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only evidence that Holton presented to support his claim of a slip
and fall during service was the testimony of a former Coast
169
His former shipmate testified
Guardsman with whom he served.
that the ship they were on was frequently in heavy seas and that it was
170
“highly likely” that Holton was injured on the ship.
The BVA
171
rejected the claim and Holton appealed to the CAVC.
The CAVC remanded (on the parties’ joint motion) to the BVA in
order to get a “medical nexus opinion” regarding the likelihood that
172
Holton’s pelvic fracture was connected to his service.
The
examining physician concluded that “[i]t would be speculative at best
to say” Holton’s current injury is related to an incident that occurred
173
almost thirty years ago.
Accordingly, the Regional Office rejected
the claim, and the BVA again affirmed, reasoning that the record
failed to include “‘even a scintilla’ of competent medical evidence
174
showing a nexus” between Holton’s current injury and his service.
175
The CAVC affirmed.
Holton appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the VA failed
to apply or misinterpreted two statutory presumptions applicable to
176
veterans disability claims.
The first presumption was the “line-of177
It states in
duty” presumption codified in 38 U.S.C. § 105(a).
relevant part:
An injury or disease incurred during active . . . service will be
deemed to have been incurred in line of duty and not the result of
the veteran’s own misconduct when the person on whose account
benefits are claimed was, at the time the injury was suffered or
disease contracted, in active [service], whether on active duty or on
authorized leave, unless such injury or disease was a result of the
178
person’s own willful misconduct . . . .

The court noted that this presumption has two important
components. First, it relieves the veteran of demonstrating that he or
179
So long as he or she
she was “at work” when the injury occurred.
180
was in active status, “a service member’s workday never ends.”

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id. at 1366.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006)).
Holton, 557 F.3d at 1366.
Id.
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Second, it relieves the veteran of the burden to demonstrate that he
181
or she was not engaged in misconduct at the time of the injury.
182
Rather, the VA must present evidence to rebut the presumption.
The second relevant statutory presumption was the “presumption
183
of sound condition.” This presumption relieves the veteran of the
burden of proving that he or she was healthy at the time of joining
184
the military.
This obviously is most beneficial to a person who
begins to show symptoms of an injury or illness while on active duty
because there can be no conclusion other than that the injury or
illness occurred while on active duty.
The court rejected Holton’s attempts to stretch both presumptions
to establish his claim for benefits. It held that neither presumption
relieves veterans from demonstrating that their current disability is
185
related to an in-service injury or disease, as Holton failed to do.
“While the section 105(a) presumption establishes that an injury or
disease that was incurred during service was incurred in the line of
duty, it is irrelevant to the question whether that in-service injury or
186
disease is causally related to the veteran’s current disability.”
Holton’s arguments that the VA did not properly apply these
presumptions to his claim were not novel ones. The court has
187
addressed similar arguments in recent years.
The court has
consistently held that “if a claimant does not show ‘a causal
relationship between his in-service and post-service medical
problems,’ the section 105(a) presumption ‘cannot fill that gap and,
188
therefore, is irrelevant.’”
As noted, Holton added a twist to his presumption argument.
He claimed that the § 105(a) presumption requires the VA to instruct
the physician conducting the medical nexus opinion to presume that
Holton suffered a pelvis injury while in-service and then to offer an

181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 241, 244 (Ct. Vet. App. 1992)
(concluding that the BVA must establish denial of a claim due to willful misconduct
by a preponderance of the evidence).
183. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1132 (applying to wartime and peacetime service,
respectively).
184. Holton, 557 F.3d at 1367.
185. Id. at 1369.
186. Id. at 1367 (emphases added) (citing Dye v. Mansfield, 504 F.3d 1289, 1292
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
187. See, e.g., Dye, 504 F.3d 1289, 1290 (affirming the CAVC’s holding that, in the
absence of any connection between the veteran’s current problems and those he
incurred while in service, the presumption of service connection is inapplicable);
Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that § 105(a)
creates a rebuttable presumption of service connection).
188. Holton, 557 F.3d at 1368 (quoting Dye, 504 F.3d at 1292).
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opinion solely as to whether his current injury is related to the
189
The court disagreed, noting that the
presumed in-service injury.
VA has a duty to provide a medical examination but that nothing
requires that the physician “presume the existence of an asserted
190
in-service injury when providing a medical nexus opinion.”
Bryant
Holton also addressed the appeal of Denver Bryant, who served on
191
active duty in the United States Army from 1943 to 1963. In 1962,
an ophthalmologist examined Bryant because he complained of eye
192
irritation and seeing halos around lights.
During the exam, the
only evidence that there was anything wrong came from a tonometer
measurement that showed “increased intra-ocular pressure in both
193
eyes.” The physician noted in his medical record, however, that the
194
Nevertheless, because no
tonometer appeared to be defective.
other tonometer was available, Bryant was diagnosed with acute
195
glaucoma.
Just one week later, however, another tonometer was
available, and the physician concluded that Bryant did not have
196
glaucoma. Further, there was no evidence of glaucoma in Bryant’s
exit physical from the Army or during exams for the next two
197
decades.
In 1990, however, a VA physician diagnosed Bryant with
198
“uncontrolled open-angle glaucoma.”
In 1996, based on that diagnosis, Bryant filed a claim for disability
199
compensation with the VA.
He pointed to the 1962 glaucoma
200
diagnosis as evidence of an in-service disease. The Regional Office
and BVA denied his claim, reasoning that the original diagnosis was
201
due to the faulty tonometer.
Bryant appealed to the CAVC and
argued that the BVA either misinterpreted or failed to apply the
202
statutory presumptions discussed above.
Bryant argued that “it is enough for a veteran to put forth some
evidence of an in-service injury or disease—no matter how little or
2.

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. at 1368–69.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1366.
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203

how credible—to trigger section 105(a).”
The court disagreed,
204
citing Madden v. Gober. Madden addressed 38 U.S.C. § 1112, which
states that, if a veteran has symptoms of certain chronic diseases
within one year after leaving the military, it is presumed that the
205
veteran contracted the disease while in active service. The veteran
in Madden, similar to Bryant, argued that “any” evidence put forth
206
should trigger the service connection presumption.
The Madden
court disagreed, and held that the BVA must evaluate the cumulative
207
The Holton court applied the same principle and ruled
evidence.
that “[s]ection 105(a) cannot serve as a substitute for affirmative
evidence that a veteran incurred an injury or disease during
208
service.”
209

E. Amberman v. Shinseki

Amberman presented the Federal Circuit with a rare opportunity to
210
interpret 38 C.F.R. § 4.14, which addresses the VA’s practice of
“pyramiding”—combining the rating for multiple disabilities that
have the same symptoms, rather than separately rating those similar
211
disabilities.
In Amberman, the court held that, on the facts
presented, the VA properly refused to assign separate ratings for
bipolar affective disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
212
because of the overlapping symptoms of the two disabilities.
Patricia Amberman served on active duty in the Army from 1977 to
213
1980.
In 1993, the VA assigned her a 30% disability rating for
214
bipolar affective disorder. After six additional years of proceedings
at the VA, the BVA granted Amberman service connection for
215
PTSD.
On remand, the Regional Office assigned a 70% disability
rating for bipolar disorder and a separate, noncompensable rating
216
for PTSD.
After another appeal to the BVA and another remand,
“the [Regional Office] determined that it had committed clear and

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 1370.
Id. (citing Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
38 U.S.C. § 1112 (2006).
Madden, 125 F.3d at 1480.
Holton, 557 F.3d at 1370.
Id.
570 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
38 C.F.R. § 4.14 (2008).
Id. at 1380–81.
Id. at 1378–79.
Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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unmistakable error by rating the two disorders separately.”
Accordingly, the Regional Office rated the disorders together and
218
assigned a 70% disability rating. The BVA affirmed in relevant part,
holding that the lack of “distinguished manifestations” between
Amberman’s bipolar disorder and PTSD justified the combined
219
rating.
Because separate (and sufficiently severe) ratings for
Amberman’s two disorders could have entitled her to special monthly
220
compensation, she appealed to the Federal Circuit.
In a unanimous opinion by Judge Gajarsa, the Federal Circuit
221
affirmed.
The court first acknowledged the general rule that
“separately diagnosed injuries are rated individually . . . then
combined into a single [disability] rating” “based on the entire
222
person of the veteran.”
The court noted, however, that 38 C.F.R.
223
Section 4.14
§ 4.14 sets forth an exception to that general rule.
states that “[t]he evaluation of the same disability under various
224
diagnoses is to be avoided.” In other words, as the court explained,
section 4.14 “caution[s] against making multiple awards for the same
physical impairment simply because that impairment could be
225
labeled in different ways.”
Amberman’s primary argument on
appeal was that bipolar affective disorder and PTSD are not
“the same disability” under section 4.14 and therefore should be
226
rated separately.
Emphasizing that “[i]t is the veteran’s overall disability that is
227
relevant,” the court endorsed the CAVC’s holding in Esteban v.
228
Brown that “two defined diagnoses constitute the same disability for
229
purposes of section 4.14 if they have overlapping symptomology.”
Turning to Amberman’s case, the court noted that “the Veterans
Court found that there were no manifestations of one mental
230
disorder that were not also manifestations of the other.”
In other
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1379 n.1 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) (2006)).
221. Id. at 1378.
222. Id. at 1380 (emphasis added).
223. Id.
224. 38 C.F.R. § 4.14 (2008) (emphasis added); see Amberman, 570 F.3d at 1380.
225. Amberman, 570 F.3d at 1380.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 6 Vet. App. 259, 262 (Ct. Vet. App. 1994) (holding that facial disfigurement,
scars, and muscle damage did not constitute the “same disability” under section 4.14
because each diagnosis dealt with different symptoms) (cited in Amberman, 570 F.3d
at 1381).
229. Amberman, 570 F.3d at 1381.
230. Id.
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words, the two disorders had completely “overlapping symptomology”
and therefore “constitue[d] the same disability for purposes of
231
section 4.14. This determination by the CAVC was a factual finding
232
that the Federal Circuit was not permitted to disturb.
Thus, the
233
court affirmed the combined rating for bipolar disorder and PTSD.
For veterans benefits practitioners, it is important to note that the
Federal Circuit’s holding does not preclude bipolar disorder and
PTSD from being assigned separate ratings in an appropriate case.
The Federal Circuit made clear that decisions about pyramiding are
to be made on a case-by-case basis, and it explicitly acknowledged that
“bipolar affective disorder and PTSD could have different symptoms
and it could therefore be improper in some circumstances for the VA
to treat these separately diagnosed conditions as producing only the
234
same disability.”
Thus, a practitioner whose client suffers from
multiple disabilities that can have overlapping symptoms is wise to
develop a factual record that emphasizes the divergent manifestations
of those disabilities in his or her particular client. Under Amberman, a
235
236
record of “different symptoms” or “distinguished manifestations”
could justify separate ratings for each disability, and possibly
enhanced benefits for the veteran.
F.

Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki

237

This case related to the type of notice that the VA must provide
when it denies a benefits claim. The court consolidated the appeals
of two veterans, Angel Vazquez-Flores and Michael Schultz, who
238
applied to the VA for an increase in their disability ratings. The VA
and BVA denied their claims, but the CAVC held that the VA failed to
239
The VA
provide adequate notice and remanded both cases.
240
appealed to the Federal Circuit, which vacated the CAVC decision.

231. Id.
232. Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (1958) (establishing that, with the exception of
constitutional issues, the federal courts of appeals cannot review “a challenge to a
factual determination”).
233. Amberman, 570 F.3d at 1381.
234. Id. (second emphasis added).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1379.
237. 580 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
238. Id. at 1272.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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Vazquez-Flores
Vazquez-Flores served on active duty in the United States Army
241
from 1963 to 1965 and again from 1966 to 1969.
After he was
discharged, he received a 30% disability rating for nephrolithiasis
(i.e., kidney stones)—the maximum rating for kidney stones under
242
the VA’s diagnostic manual. It is possible however, for a veteran to
use other, similar codes to obtain a higher rating. For example, even
though kidney stones can only receive a maximum of 30%,
nephrolithiasis can, in certain circumstances, be classified as
“hydronephrosis,” which when severe can in turn be classified as
243
“renal dysfunction.”
If hypertension causes renal dysfunction,
244
it can be rated anywhere from 40% to 60%.
In 1994, Vazquez-Flores filed a claim to increase his rating, which
245
the VA denied. Vazquez-Flores appealed to the BVA, which denied
his appeal and found that the notice the VA provided to Vazquez246
The notice
Flores regarding its denial of his claim was sufficient.
referenced diagnostic codes for nephrolithiasis, hydronephrosis, and
247
renal dysfunction, but not hypertension. He then appealed to the
CAVC, where he argued that the VA’s notice was deficient because it
failed to inform him that he could seek to codify his illness under a
248
different code and thus potentially be eligible for a higher rating.
The CAVC held that the VA failed to properly notify Vazquez-Flores
because it did not tell him how to substantiate a claim for an
249
increased rating and because the notice was generally “confusing.”

1.

Schultz
Schultz served on active duty during the 1980s and 1990s and
received a 20% disability rating for a right shoulder injury, and a 10%
250
disability rating for a disability in both knees. In 1997, he applied
251
for an increased rating but the VA denied his claim.
The VA
notified Schultz of the denial and informed him that, in order to
receive a higher rating, he must submit evidence that his injury had
2.

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id.; see 38 C.F.R. § 4.115b (2009).
Vazquez-Flores, 580 F.3d at 1272.
Id.; see 38 C.F.R. § 4.115.
Vazquez-Flores, 580 F.3d at 1272.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1272–73.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
Id.
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252

“become worse or more disabling.”
Schultz underwent additional
medical exams and resubmitted his claim to the BVA, which denied
253
Schultz
his claim and found that the VA’s notice was sufficient.
254
appealed to the CAVC, which relied on Vazquez-Flores’s case in
holding that the VA failed to provide sufficient notice under 38
U.S.C. § 5103(a) because the notice “did not inform [Schultz] that he
should submit evidence describing the effects of his worsened
255
condition on his employability and daily life.” Moreover, the CAVC
reasoned that the notice should have informed Schultz that his knee
injury could be evaluated under codes that assigned ratings for
“limitation of motion” or other factors, even though his initial rating
256
did not reference any other codes.
3.

On appeal
a.

Notice

The Federal Circuit began with the CAVC’s holding regarding what
constituted sufficient notice. The CAVC held that a proper notice
should include:
[A] review of the previously assigned [disability code] and disability
rating, and a commonsense assessment whether the criteria for a
higher rating under the assigned or a cross-referenced [disability
code] includes criteria that would not be satisfied by the claimant
demonstrating a noticeable worsening or increase in severity of the
disability and the effect of that worsening . . . on the claimant’s
employment and daily life (such as a specific measurement or test
result). If it does, then general notice of that criteria must be
257
provided to the claimant.

In other words, the VA would have to give veterans notice of
alternate disability codes that could potentially apply to them and
explain to veterans how to prove the codes’ applicability.
The VA appealed both cases because, it argued, such a
requirement would essentially require the VA to review each veteran’s
case at a level of detail that is not required by Federal Circuit
258
decisions in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Vazquez-Flores v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 37 (Ct. Vet. App. 2008), vacated,
Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1270 (2009).
255. Vazquez-Flores, 580 F.3d at 1274 (internal quotations omitted).
256. Id. at 1274–75.
257. Id. at 1275–76 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
258. 345 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (addressing a general challenge to 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.159(b)(1), a regulation promulgated after enactment of the VCAA).
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259

and Wilson v. Manfield.
The VA would have to think of every
conceivable diagnostic code that the veteran could apply for, and
then tell the veteran how to satisfy that particular code and every
medical test that the veteran could take to prove his or her condition
260
had worsened.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the VA, holding that Wilson and
Paralyzed Veterans “put to rest the notion” that the VA is required to
261
provide notice that is “veteran-specific.” Rather, the VA need only
provide a generic notice that is “claim-specific” (i.e., depending
whether the claim is an initial claim for benefits or a claim for an
increased rating). In the court’s view, this claim-specific notice need
only inform the veteran why the claim was rejected and provide an
262
opportunity to submit additional evidence.
b.

Daily life

In addition to appealing the CAVC’s holding that sufficient notice
should include alternative diagnostic code criteria, the VA also
appealed the CAVC’s holding that proper notice should include
evidence regarding how the veteran’s disability affects his or her
263
“daily life.”
The CAVC held: “[T]he Secretary [must] notify the
claimant that, to substantiate a claim, the claimant must provide, or
ask the Secretary to obtain . . . evidence demonstrating a
worsening . . . of the disability and the effect that worsening has on
264
the claimant’s employment and daily life.”
The VA argued that the “daily life” requirement is inconsistent with
the statute, which requires the VA to rate disabilities based on a
veteran’s average reduced capacity to earn a living in the civilian
265
world.
Moreover, the VA argued that Congress never defined
“disability,” and thus the VA’s interpretation of the term should
266
receive Chevron deference. The VA has defined “disability” to mean
267
“impairment in earning capacity.”

259. 506 F.3d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (addressing a veteran-specific challenge to
38 U.S.C. § 5103(a)).
260. See Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 21, Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d
1270 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 2008-7115) (explaining the VA’s general notice
responsibilities and distinguishing those responsibilities from case-specific ones).
261. Vazquez-Flores, 580 F.3d at 1277.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1278.
264. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
265. Id. at 1279 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2006)).
266. Id.; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843–44 (1984).
267. 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2009).
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The veterans countered that the “daily life” requirement is
contained in 38 C.F.R. § 4.10, which states that the “basis of disability
evaluations is the ability of the body as a whole . . . to function under
268
the ordinary conditions of daily life including employment.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the VA, reasoning that the portion
of regulations that use the term “daily life” govern “policies and
procedures for conducting VA medical examinations,” which are not
considered part of the ratings schedule because “the rating schedule
consists only of those regulations that establish disabilities and set
269
forth the terms under which compensation shall be provided.”
“Thus, while the effects of a disability . . . are arguably relevant to a
doctor conducting a medical examination, those effects are not
270
relevant to a disability rating made by a ratings specialist.”
In sum, Vazquez-Flores holds that notice under 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a)
271
need not be veteran-specific. Accordingly, the VA need not suggest
every potential disability code or list every possible medical test that a
veteran could procure to prove his claim. Rather, it need only be a
generic notice that tells the veteran “why his claim was rejected and
272
[provides] an opportunity to submit additional relevant evidence.”
Likewise, the VA need not consider how a veteran’s disability affects
273
his or her “daily life” unless it affects the ability to earn a living.
The court’s holding illustrates two important points for
practitioners. First, despite the VA’s duty to assist a veteran with his
or her claim, no veteran or veteran’s attorney should rely on the VA
for research or presume that what the VA says is the only answer.
Rather, veterans and attorneys should research the diagnostic codes
to see if the veteran’s disability can be codified under an alternate
code or cross-referenced. Second, if a veteran’s disability impacts his
or her daily life, the time to bring that up is during the medical exam.
In the context of a claim, any reference to how the disability impacts
the veteran’s daily life must be closely tied to the veteran’s reduced
capacity to earn a living.

268. Vazquez-Flores, 580 F.3d at 1279 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.10).
269. Id. at 1280 (quoting Martinak v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 447, 451–52
(Ct. Vet. App. 2007)).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1280–81.
272. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Mansfield, 506 F.3d 1055, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
273. See id. at 1279 (holding that 38 U.S.C. § 1155 focuses on earning capacity).
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274

G. Moore v. Shinseki

In Moore, the Federal Circuit examined the VA’s duty to assist
veterans with their claims pursuant to the VCAA. Specifically, the
court addressed the VA’s obligation to obtain relevant medical
275
records.
The Federal Circuit vacated the decision of the CAVC,
276
which had affirmed the BVA.
Dwayne Moore served on active duty from May 1988 to February
277
1991. During his service, he was admitted to a psychiatric hospital
278
for lacerating his own wrists.
A psychiatrist diagnosed him with
“a severe personality disorder which render[ed] him a danger to
himself and/or others” and recommended an “expeditious”
279
separation from the service.
In 1992, Moore filed a claim for
280
disability related to his psychiatric disorder, which the VA denied.
In 1996, one VA examiner concluded that “the event leading up to
281
the veteran’s discharge was a single episode that was now resolved.”
In 1999, however, the VA assigned Moore a 10% disability rating
(based on the 1996 examination) retroactive to September 16,
282
1992.
Moore appealed to the BVA, which in 2004 assigned him a
rating of 30% from January 1997 to August 7, 2002 and 50% from
283
August 8, 2002 onward. The BVA concluded, however, that he did
not rate higher than 10% from 1992 to January 1997 because
“he suffered from only ‘mild social and industrial impairment’ during
284
that period.”
Moore appealed all of his ratings to the CAVC, arguing that the
VA, before making any determination with respect to his disability
rating, had an “affirmative obligation, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5103A,
to obtain the medical records” from the psychiatric hospital to which
285
he was committed while he was on active duty.
The CAVC
disagreed, reasoning that even if the VA had obtained the records,
286
they would not have helped. Moreover, the issue as the CAVC saw

274. 555 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
275. Id. at 1370.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1370–71.
284. Id. at 1371.
285. Id. Section 5103A was added by the VCAA in 2000. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A
(2006).
286. Moore, 555 F.3d at 1371.
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it was not the records when Moore was hospitalized, but his condition
287
The CAVC also
from September 1992 (his discharge) forward.
pointed out that the record included a “description of [Moore’s]
in-service symptoms,” which had been prepared within two weeks
after he left the psychiatric ward, and that Moore had failed to show
how the missing records would be “meaningfully different” from what
288
the VA already had in its possession.
Judge Kasold dissented,
reasoning that the psychiatric hospital records were “relevant on their
face” and should have been obtained and reviewed prior to the VA
289
making a determination.
Moore appealed to the Federal Circuit, again arguing that § 5103A
required the VA to get his medical records from the psychiatric
hospital before rendering a disability determination, and that the VA
misinterpreted § 5103A in finding his past medical records
290
irrelevant. The court agreed with Moore and attacked the CAVC’s
reasoning that “the only pertinent issue was the degree of Moore’s
disability after September 16, 1992” and that the psychiatric hospital
records “were not relevant because they pre-dated the period for
291
which he sought disability compensation.”
For support, the court
cited the VA’s own regulations, which specifically require the VA “to
292
“Over a period of
assess a disability in ‘relation to its history.’”
many years, a veteran’s disability claim may require reratings in
accordance with changes in . . . physical or mental condition. It is
thus essential . . . that each disability be viewed in relation to its
293
history.”
The court explained that consideration of an illness’s
entire history is “particularly important in the context of psychiatric
294
Accordingly, when
disorders ‘[because they] abate and recur.’”
rating a veteran with psychiatric disorders, the VA must base its
decision on “all the evidence of record that bears on occupational
and social impairment rather than solely on the examiner’s
295
assessment of the level of disability at the moment of examination.”
In response to the government’s argument that not getting the
record constituted harmless error, the court noted that the VCAA
requires the VA to “obtain all of the veteran’s relevant service medical

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 1372.
Id.
Id. at 1373 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2009)).
Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.1).
Id.
Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.126(a)).
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296

records.”
The record, the court noted, did not demonstrate that
the VA made any effort to get Moore’s records from the psychiatric
297
The court also was not pleased that at oral argument,
hospital.
Moore’s counsel advised the court that he had obtained the missing
records that day and that they had been “‘lost in the bowels’ of the
298
National Personnel Records Center.” This revelation prompted the
court to note that “[b]ecause many veterans lack the knowledge and
resources necessary to locate relevant records, Congress has
appropriately placed the burden on the VA to ensure that all relevant
299
service medical records are obtained and fully evaluated.”
The court did not stop there: “It is shameful that the VA yet again
failed in its duty to assist the veteran and, at best, poor judgment by
300
the Department of Justice in defending the VA’s actions.”
Similar to its “harmless error” argument, the government argued
that, even if it had obtained Moore’s psychiatric hospital records,
301
he would not have received a higher rating.
However, the court
“fail[ed] to understand how the government, without examining the
[psychiatric hospital] records, can have any idea as to whether they
would, or would not, support Moore’s claim for an increased
302
disability rating.”
The court agreed with Judge Kasold’s CAVC
dissent that the records were “relevant on their face” because they
303
pertained to his current disability. “Such records could potentially
call into question the VA’s conclusion that Moore suffered from only
‘mild social and industrial impairment’ and was therefore entitled to
no more than a 10 percent disability rating in the period after
304
September 1992.”
Moore illustrates important points about obtaining records.
First, the court’s insistence that the actual records be obtained as
opposed to relying on a summary of those records demonstrates how
important the records are in deciding claims. The leading treatise
for veterans benefits practitioners states that obtaining records is
305
“the most important factor” to being an effective advocate. In some
cases, the obstacle to obtaining that information is that the VA tried
296. Id. at 1374; see 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2006) (codifying the VA’s duty to assist
claimants).
297. Moore, 555 F.3d at 1374.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1374–75.
300. Id. at 1375.
301. Id.
302. Id. (citing McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. STICHMAN ET AL., supra note 10, § 1.1.1.
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but could not locate the records. Moore was unique in that the VA:
(1) did not attempt to locate the records; (2) argued that it had no
duty to locate the records; and (3) argued that the records were
irrelevant.
Second, practitioners should be aware of record
“summaries.” The VA relies heavily on “summaries” of records
because it has so many cases to adjudicate. But just like in the
“telephone” game, potentially important information gets left out or
altered every time someone summarizes a medical record.
Accordingly, veterans and their attorneys should insist that the
originals be obtained (and should look for them on their own, as
Moore’s counsel did), and should read them thoroughly to ensure
that the summaries do not omit material information.
306

H. Walch v. Shinseki

While Moore addresses what actions VA is required to affirmatively
take to fulfill the duty to assist, Walch demonstrates the limitations on
that duty. In Walch, the Federal Circuit held that the VA’s duty does
not extend to forwarding sua sponte certain medical evidence to a
veteran’s private physician if the veteran is also in possession of that
307
evidence.
308
Richard Walch served on active duty from 1954 to 1957. Walch’s
military medical records indicated that during his service he was
309
treated for injuries to his left knee on two occasions. His discharge
310
physical, however, showed that his knee had healed. This was also
the conclusion shortly after Walch was discharged and when he filed
311
for disability compensation related to his left knee. The VA denied
312
Walch did
the claim because it found “no orthopedic condition.”
not appeal, making the decision final. In 1966, Walch injured his left
313
knee and broke his tibia during a softball game. His prognosis was
“generally good,” but the doctor noted the “possibility of long-term
314
arthritis in the [left] knee.”
315
In 1992, Walch sought to reopen his claim.
He submitted
evidence from private physicians who had treated him for left knee

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

563 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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problems over the years including moderate degenerative arthritis
and a total knee replacement, and the hospital report from his 1966
316
softball injury. In deciding to reopen Walch’s claim, the BVA relied
on a letter from Walch’s physician that concluded that there was a
likelihood that Walch’s current osteoarthritis was connected to his
317
two in-service knee injuries. It submitted his reopened case to the
VA Regional Office for further development and assigned one of its
318
physicians, Dr. James Burton, to review the case.
After reviewing the file, Dr. Burton concluded that there was a
greater than 50% chance that Walch’s osteoarthritis was related to
the traumatic injury he incurred in 1966 while playing softball and
not a greater than 50% chance that it was related to his two in-service
319
knee injuries. He presented this conclusion in a six-page report in
320
which he summarized all of the relevant medical evidence. Walch’s
private physician, Dr. Michael Sousa, also submitted a letter to the
321
BVA that the BVA found lacking on several grounds. Although his
letter mentioned Walch’s two in-service injuries, it did not describe
322
Moreover, Dr. Sousa failed to consider Walch’s traumatic
them.
323
softball injury.
Accordingly, the BVA relied on Dr. Burton’s
324
325
opinion and denied Walch’s claim. Walch appealed to the CAVC.
On appeal, Walch argued that the VA had a duty to sua sponte
forward his entire claim file to his private physician, Dr. Sousa, before
326
giving more weight to Dr. Burton’s opinion. The CAVC disagreed.
It conceded that if Dr. Sousa had stated that he could not provide a
complete analysis without such records, the VA might have been
327
obligated to send him the file—but this had not occurred.
Moreover, the BVA assigned less weight to Dr. Sousa’s opinion
because he failed to mention the traumatic softball injury, which was
detailed in private medical records that Walch either had or could
328
have released to Dr. Sousa without any assistance from the VA.

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. at 1375–76.
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1376–77.
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Walch appealed to the Federal Circuit, where he argued that the
CAVC misinterpreted the VA’s duty to assist veterans with their claims
329
pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)–(c) by holding that the VA does
not have a duty to sua sponte forward all medical records in its
330
possession to a veteran’s private physician.
The court disagreed with Walch, viewing his argument as trying to
331
extend § 5103A too far.
Section 5103A(a)(1) obliges the VA to
“make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence
332
That includes
necessary to substantiate the claimant’s claim.”
obtaining the veteran’s military medical record, records from
treatment they received at VA hospitals, or other relevant records
333
held by the federal government. It also extends to private records
334
that the claimant authorizes the VA to obtain. It does not, however,
“require the VA to provide the veteran with evidence that is already in
his possession” because “[t]he VA’s duty to assist is not an
335
unbounded obligation.”
Walch leaves no doubt that, despite the VA’s long list of statutory
obligations to assist veterans with their claims, there are limits.
The facts of Walch were such that the VA was able to obtain a strongly336
worded opinion limiting its obligations.
However, there will likely be cases that test Walch’s holding. It is
not difficult to imagine scenarios where active duty service members
and veterans receive treatment from private physicians but it is
unclear who has which records. For example, if a service member
gets sick while on vacation and is not near a military hospital, he or
she is authorized to get treatment at the nearest emergency room.
Many times, those private records do not become part of the service
member’s military medical record. Similarly, if a service member or
veteran requires treatment that is not available at certain bases or VA
hospitals, he or she will often be referred to a civilian physician with
the required skill set. Again, those private records may fall through

329. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(1)–(3) (2009) (regulation implementing 38 U.S.C.
§ 5103A).
330. Walch, 563 F.3d at 1377.
331. Id.
332. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1) (2006)).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1378. The court left an interesting question undecided. The VA
argued that, had it sua sponte forwarded Walch’s claim file to a private physician
without receiving a request from either Walch or the physician, it would have
violated the Health Portability and Accountability Act and the VA’s own privacy
regulations. See id. at 1378 n.3.
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the cracks and not become part of the veteran’s military records.
In such cases, if the veteran has those records in his or her
possession, Walch holds that the VA has no duty to sua sponte obtain
those records and provide them to the veteran’s private physician.
However, unless the veteran submits the records to the VA as part of
his claims file, it is unclear how the VA will determine whether the
veteran in fact has the records.
I.

Military Order of the Purple Heart of the USA v. Secretary of
337
Veterans Affairs

As noted above, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction not
only over appeals from decisions of the CAVC, but also over petitions
for review challenging VA regulations, rules, and statements of
338
policy. These petitions for review are governed by the standards of
339
In Purple Heart, the
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Federal Circuit granted a petition for review and vacated a VA rule
that subjected certain large awards to enhanced scrutiny without the
340
knowledge or participation of the veteran.
On August 27, 2007, the VA issued a directive, “Fast Letter 07-19,”
341
to all Regional Offices.
The directive applied to Regional Office
decisions that either (a) awarded lump sums of $250,000 or more or
342
(b) had a retroactive effective date of eight years or more.
It required these so-called “Extraordinary Awards” to be sent to the
director of the Compensation and Pension (C&P) Service for “final
343
determination.” In addition, the directive stated that the Regional
Office decision granting the extraordinary award should not be
disclosed to the veteran, that the veteran should not be told that the
C&P review occurred, and that the veteran should not be told if the
344
C&P Service reduced the original award.
Veterans organizations
345
They argued that
petitioned the Federal Circuit for direct review.
the C&P procedure was contrary to law and therefore invalid under
337. 580 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
338. See supra Part II.B.
339. See 38 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) (“An action of the Secretary to which section
552(a)(1) or 553 of title 5 (or both) refers is subject to judicial review. Such review
shall be in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5 and may be sought only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”); see also Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (describing the principles of judicial review of agency
actions).
340. See Purple Heart, 580 F.3d at 1294.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1294–95.
345. Id. at 1294.
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346

the APA because it excluded the veteran from knowing about and
participating in the proceeding, and because the VA adopted the
347
procedure without public notice and an opportunity for comment.
A divided panel of the Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Newman, granted the petition and set aside the C&P review
348
procedure. The court first rejected two threshold arguments raised
by the VA. First, the VA contended that the petition was moot
because the VA had since issued a new directive, “Fast Letter 08-24,”
which altered some of the terminology used in the original
349
directive.
However, because the C&P review procedure from the
original directive was unchanged, the court ruled that the petition
350
In addition, the VA asserted that the new C&P
was not moot.
procedure was not subject to Federal Circuit review because it was not
351
a “rule” as defined in the APA.
But the court rejected this
argument, too, writing that the procedural change at issue was
“a change in existing law or policy which affects individual rights and
352
obligations,” and was therefore a “rule” subject to judicial review.
Turning to the substance of the challenge, three VA regulations
weighed heavily on the court’s determination that the C&P review
process was contrary to law and therefore invalid:
• 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a), which provides claimants with, among
other things, the right to a hearing, and imposes on the VA
“the obligation . . . to assist a claimant in developing the facts
pertinent to the claim”;
• 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(1), which entitles a claimant “to a
hearing at any time on any issue involved in a claim” before a
VA employee with “original determinative authority” over the
issue involved; and
• 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2), which explains that the purpose of
the hearing under subsection (c)(1) is to provide the
346. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”).
347. Purple Heart, 580 F.3d at 1294.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 1295.
350. Id. at 1296 (“Since the procedures of Fast Letter 07-19 continue unchanged,
and there has been no cessation of the challenged conduct, the appeal is not
mooted.”).
351. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (providing that “‘rule’ means the whole or a part
of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency”).
352. Purple Heart, 580 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg,
932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted)).
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claimant with an opportunity to present additional pertinent
353
evidence and arguments “in person.”
The court first noted that, under the new C&P procedure,
“the veteran does not have a hearing in the presence of the persons
who now have final decisional authority for regional office decisions,”
354
in direct contravention of subsection (c)(1). Because of the lack of
hearing, and because the veteran would not be told of any reduction
in the award resulting from C&P review, the court also determined
that the new procedure deprived the veteran of his right under
subsection (c)(2) to present additional evidence and arguments in
355
support of his claim.
In addition, the court emphasized that the
new procedure did not provide “in person” interaction with the
“deciding official,” i.e., the C&P reviewer, as required by subsection
356
(c)(2).
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the C&P
procedure was permitted by 38 U.S.C. § 5109A, which permits the VA
357
to challenge any decision of the Regional Office.
The court
observed that review under § 5109A is for “clear and unmistakable
error” only, whereas the C&P procedure “require[d] no deference to
358
the regional office.”
The court thus concluded that the new C&P
359
procedure was “not in accordance with law,” granted the petition
for review, and vacated the procedure set forth in Fast Letters 07-19
360
and 08-24.
Judge Schall concurred in the court’s ruling that the petition was
not moot, but dissented from the remainder of Judge Newman’s
opinion.
He first contended that the “extraordinary award
procedure” (EAP) set forth in the Fast Letters was “a rule of agency
procedure, which is exempted from notice and comment
361
requirements” by the APA.
Judge Schall also viewed the EAP
procedure as consistent with § 5109A because that section, in his
view, applies the clear-and-unmistakable-error standard only to final
decisions of the Regional Office, and does not preclude “de novo
362
Finally, Judge Schall
internal review of draft rating decisions.”

353. See id. at 1296–97 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (2009).
354. Id. at 1297.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
360. Purple Heart, 580 F.3d at 1297–98.
361. Id. at 1298–99 (Schall, J., dissenting); see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (providing that
public notice is not required for “rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice”).
362. Purple Heart, 580 F.3d at 1299 (Schall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

2010]

TEN 2009 VETERANS BENEFITS LAW CASES

1195

contended that the EAP procedure was not contrary to the governing
regulations because (i) the veteran retained the right to a hearing
before the Regional Office; (ii) this hearing would still occur
“in person”; and (iii) the VA’s duty to assist was unhampered, as the
Regional Office could still explain the issue and suggest that the
363
veteran submit additional evidence.
However, the difficulty with the position adopted by Judge Schall is
that, as he acknowledged, “the policy guidance provided by the C&P
364
Service . . . apparently binds the Regional Office.”
So, after the
C&P Service has reduced an award, any in-person hearing before the
Regional Office is relatively meaningless—any “decision-making
authority” retained by the Regional Office after C&P review is largely
365
pro forma. While the Regional Office could certainly still “suggest
the submission of additional evidence . . . which would be of
advantage to the claimant’s position,” any subsequent “extraordinary”
award based on this additional evidence would return to the C&P
366
Service for further review.
So, while it could be argued that the
veteran’s ongoing interaction with the Regional Office satisfies the
letter of section 3.103(c)(1)’s requirement of an “in person” hearing
before a VA employee who has “original determinative authority,”
that section’s spirit is certainly unfulfilled when the actual decisionmaking authority rests with the C&P Service.
Although the Federal Circuit has rejected the VA’s first effort at
heightening the scrutiny given to large awards as both procedurally
and substantively flawed, the VA is certainly free to correct the errors
identified by the court and to try to implement, through notice-andcomment rulemaking, a process for reviewing extraordinary awards
that complies with the law. Given that the pre-Purple Heart C&P
review process resulted in the reduction of proposed benefits in the
367
“vast majority” of cases subject to review, practitioners should be
mindful of the possibility for future rulemaking on this topic, and
should regularly monitor the Federal Register for new rules and
368
regulations published by the VA.
363. Id. at 1300–01.
364. Id. at 1300.
365. Id. at 1300–01; cf. id. at 1300 (“A claimant whose file qualifies for the EAP is
free to request a hearing and to submit evidence ‘in person’ to the RO at any time
while a claim is pending, including before and after C&P Service review.”).
366. Id. at 1301 (alteration in original).
367. See id. at 1297 n.2 (majority opinion) (quoting Veterans for Common Sense v.
Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1076–77 (N.D. Cal. 2008)) (internal quotations
omitted) (reporting on C&P’s review of approximately 800 rating decisions to
determine if benefits should be awarded retroactively).
368. For free-of-charge access to the VA’s recently published regulations, see Dep’t
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369

Reizenstein v. Shinseki

Reizenstein presented another question of administrative law.
It addressed a VA regulation governing the reduction of total
disability ratings. The VA had interpreted this regulation as
inapplicable in the context of total disability ratings awarded as part
370
of a retrospective staged rating. The court in Reizenstein considered
whether the VA’s position was properly entitled to Chevron
371
deference, and, if so, whether the VA’s interpretation of the
regulation was reasonable. The Federal Circuit determined that the
VA’s position was entitled to deference and that the agency’s
372
interpretation was reasonable.
Reizenstein served on active duty in three branches of the armed
373
forces at intermittent periods between 1968 and 1981.
In 1996,
Reizenstein filed a benefits claim for post-traumatic stress disorder
374
(PTSD). The VA denied this claim in 1997 but, following treatment
at a VA medical center in 1998, Reizenstein was diagnosed with a
375
Reizenstein thereafter
number of conditions, including PTSD.
appealed his 1997 denial and the VA retroactively assigned a 30%
376
disability rating beginning in November 1996.
Reizenstein
appealed this decision and the BVA awarded him a retrospective
377
staged award in March 2006.
In relevant part, this retrospective
award afforded Reizenstein a 100% disability rating from March 22,
1998, to May 5, 1999, but then reduced the rating to 30% from May
378
6, 1999 through the present.
The BVA premised its decision to
reduce the disability rating on a May 6, 1999 mental health treatment
note that documented a reduction in the severity of Reizenstein’s
379
condition.
Reizeinstein again challenged the BVA’s decision on
several grounds, one of which was the apparent conflict between the
May 6, 1999 reduction from a 100% disability rating and a VA
regulation, 38 C.F.R § 3.343(a), which forbids reductions from total

of Veterans Affairs, VA Regulations, http://www1.va.gov/orpm/page.cfm?pg=47
(last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
369. 583 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
370. Id. at 1335.
371. Id.; see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843–44 (1984).
372. Id. at 1338.
373. Id. at 1333.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
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disability ratings without a medical examination: “Total disability
ratings, when warranted by the severity of the condition and not
granted purely because of hospital, surgical, or home treatment,
or individual unemployability will not be reduced, in the absence of
clear error, without examination showing material improvement in
380
physical or mental condition.”
On appeal, the CAVC noted that the VA enacted section 3.343(a)
to protect veterans who were completely dependent on disability
381
benefits from arbitrary reductions.
The CAVC held that it would
not advance that purpose to apply the regulation in the context of
staged ratings, which provide retrospective lump-sum payments.
The CAVC therefore determined that section 3.343(a) did not apply
382
to Reizenstein’s claim.
383
It found that section 3.343(a), as
The Federal Circuit affirmed.
an interpretation by the VA of its own regulations, was entitled to
broad deference, even greater than that typically afforded to an
384
agency’s construction of a statute. Under this framework, the court
found the government’s interpretation of section 3.343(a) to be
385
reasonable.
The holding of Reizenstein should put practitioners of veterans law
on notice that challenges to retroactive reductions of total disability
ratings are difficult to establish. More generally, it illustrates the
difficulty of challenging VA interpretations of the department’s own
regulations.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court decided many
important veterans law cases in 2009. In Sanders, the Supreme Court
made a rare but significant foray into the field, holding that it is the
veteran’s burden, not the VA’s, to prove that the VA’s failure to
provide notice was prejudicial. The Federal Circuit decided a wide
range of legal questions, holding, inter alia, that veterans have a Fifth
Amendment due process right to a claim for benefits; that there is no
equitable tolling of the 120-day deadline to appeal a BVA decision to
the CAVC; that the VA need not provide separate ratings for diseases
with overlapping symptoms; and that the VA need not provide notice
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Id. at 1334 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(a) (2009)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1337.
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that is specific to each veteran. Also, under various fact patterns, the
court elaborated on the VA’s statutory duty to assist veterans in
developing their claims. In the years to come, an aging population of
veterans from the Korean and Vietnam Wars, as well as veterans from
the on-going military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, will continue to
present the Federal Circuit with challenging and significant questions
of veterans benefits law.

